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The Patient’s Right to Safety — Improving the Quality of Care 
through Litigation against Hospitals
George J. Annas, J.D., M.P.H.
It is the consensus of experts in the patient-safe-
ty field that little has changed to improve the 
safety of hospital care since the Institute of Med-
icine’s 1999 report, To Err Is Human.1-5 The report 
noted that in order to be successful, “safety must 
be an explicit organizational goal that is demon-
strated by clear organizational leadership. . . . 
This process begins when boards of directors dem-
onstrate their commitment to this objective by reg-
ular, close oversight of the safety of the institu-
tions they shepherd.”1 Leape and Berwick agree, 
noting that safety cannot become an institution-
al priority “without more sustained and powerful 
pressure on hospital boards and leaders — pres-
sure that must come from outside the health in-
dustry.” 2 In hospital care, the challenge is to reform 
corporate governance to make hospital boards take 
their responsibility for patient safety at least as 
seriously as they take the hospital’s financial con-
dition.
Most patient-safety experts continue to believe 
that the threat of liability is the primary barrier 
to the development of effective and comprehen-
sive patient-safety programs in hospitals.1-7 I sug-
gest, on the contrary (and no doubt controversial-
ly among physicians), that judicial recognition of 
an explicit “right to safety” for hospital patients, 
with a correlative duty of hospitals to implement 
patient-safety measures, can become the primary 
motivator for the development of systems to im-
prove patient safety. Hospitals that do not take spe-
cific actions to improve safety should be viewed 
as negligent and be subject to malpractice law-
suits when a violation of the right to safety results 
in injury.
hospital s and corpor ate 
responsibilit y
Patients have rights, even when they are in the hos-
pital. Such rights, most centrally, include the right 
to information (often termed informed consent 
or informed choice), the right to refuse any treat-
ment, the right to privacy and confidentiality, the 
right to emergency treatment, and the right to 
be treated with dignity.8 A patient’s right to safety 
could be derived from the fiduciary nature of 
the doctor–patient relationship.8 But physicians 
do not control all possible risks of injury in the 
hospital setting. Therefore, it is more appropriate 
to focus on the hospital and to define the scope 
of the right to safety as a reflection of corporate 
responsibility: the obligation of a hospital to main-
tain a safe environment for patients and for their 
health care providers.
Hospitals are corporations (artificial persons 
created by law), and their obligations are imposed 
on them by law, their own bylaws, their mission 
statements, their internal rules, licensing regula-
tions, and accreditation standards. Hospitals are 
responsible for their own negligence under the 
doctrine of corporate responsibility, which courts 
have applied directly to hospitals. Although the 
law usually permits industries and professions to 
set their own practice standards, courts have also 
ruled that entire industries and professions can 
be negligent by failing to adopt new technologies, 
especially those that are inexpensive and effec-
tive, and that judges and juries must ultimately 
determine what is reasonable.9-11
The famous 1932 T.J. Hooper  case, for example, 
involved the question of whether it was negligent 
for a tugboat not to have a wireless radio on board 
to get weather reports. The tugboat sank with the 
plaintiff’s cargo during a predicted storm that the 
tugboat could easily have avoided had the captain 
listened to weather forecasts. The practice in the 
tugboat industry was not to carry wireless radi-
os, but the court rejected this “nobody does it” 
defense:
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A whole calling may have unduly lagged in 
the adoption of new and available devices. It 
never may set its own tests, however per-
suasive be its usages. Courts must in the 
end say what is required; there are precau-
tions so imperative that even their universal 
disregard will not excuse their omission.9 
Specifically with respect to health care, other 
courts have held that “conformity with established 
medical custom practiced by minimally compe-
tent physicians, . . . while evidence of perfor-
mance of the duty of care, may never be conclu-
sive of such compliance.”10
The major safety-related reasons for which 
hospitals have been successfully sued are inade-
quate nursing staff and inadequate facilities. Since 
providing a safe environment for patient care is 
a corporate responsibility, understaffing is cor-
porate negligence. The best known of such suits 
is the 1965 case of Darling v. Charlestown Community 
Memorial Hospital, in which the Supreme Court of 
Illinois determined that a jury could find that a 
hospital was negligent for not having a sufficient 
number of qualified nurses to monitor a patient, 
whose leg had to be amputated because his cast 
had been put on too tight — a fact that was not 
discovered by the nursing staff in time to pre-
vent injury.11
In another case, the Supreme Court of Mis-
sissippi held that it was for the jury to decide if 
a hospital was negligent for failing to keep an 
operating room available in case a high-risk pa-
tient undergoing cardiac catheterization required 
emergency surgery to survive. The patient died 
because all of the hospital’s operating rooms were 
in use when he needed emergency surgery as a 
result of the cardiac catheterization. Even though 
other hospitals followed the same practice, the 
court ruled: “In assessing reasonable conduct 
there is a vast difference between taking a chance 
when unavoidable and when avoidable. Taking a 
1 percent chance when necessary might be exem-
plary, but taking the same chance when unnec-
essary might be negligence.”12
Although courts have not explicitly adopted a 
specific right to safety, they have discussed the 
protection of the patient’s safety as an aspect of 
corporate responsibility. Hospitals are more than 
hotels that rent out bedrooms. In 1991, for exam-
ple, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated sim-
ply, “Corporate negligence is a doctrine under 
which the hospital is liable if it fails to uphold 
the proper standard of care owed the patient, 
which is to ensure the patient’s safety and well-
being while at the hospital.”13 The court also 
listed four specific examples that previous courts 
had identified as hospital safety obligations: the 
maintenance of safe and adequate facilities and 
equipment, the selection and retention of com-
petent physicians, the oversight of medical prac-
tice within the hospital, and the adoption and 
enforcement of adequate rules and policies to en-
sure the quality of care for patients.13
Specific hospital obligations would flow from 
the recognition of a patient’s right to safety. For 
example, courts could determine that a hospital’s 
failure to adopt a new technology to prevent the 
injury of patients — such as a computerized drug-
ordering system — could subject the hospital to 
liability for injury in cases in which it could be 
demonstrated that adoption of the technology 
would not have been prohibitively expensive and 
would probably have prevented the injury. Noso-
comial infections resulting from a hospital’s fail-
ure to adopt or enforce hand-washing policies 
would be even easier to demonstrate as a breach 
of a hospital’s duty to keep patients safe.14 The 
100,000 Lives Campaign of the Institute for Health-
care Improvement is promoting six evidence-
based safety interventions: deployment of rapid-
response teams, reliable care for acute myocardial 
infarction, medication reconciliation, and preven-
tion of central-line infections, surgical-site infec-
tions, and ventilator-associated pneumonia.15 More 
than half of all U.S. hospitals have already joined 
the campaign,15 which helps make these six safe-
ty interventions the “standard of care” for all hos-
pitals. Potential liability for not adopting these 
safety measures should give the remaining hos-
pitals an added incentive either to adopt them 
or to explain why particular interventions will not 
improve patient safety in their institutions.
enforcing the right to safet y
In the absence of a comprehensive social insur-
ance system, the patient’s right to safety can be 
enforced only by a legal claim against the hospi-
tal. The hospital, not the physician, satisfies or 
breaches the duty to ensure patient safety. And 
more liability suits against hospitals may be nec-
essary to motivate hospital boards to take patient 
safety more seriously. The question of whether to 
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take the additional step of moving to enterprise 
liability — in which all medical liability suits (in-
cluding those alleging negligence by physicians) 
are brought against hospitals — deserves more 
serious consideration than it has had to date. It 
should be emphasized that the goal is not to en-
courage more litigation for its own sake. The goal 
is the prevention of injury, and focusing on liti-
gation provides a strong incentive for hospitals to 
make their environments safer.
Patient-safety experts almost uniformly insist 
that hospitals need to establish a system of re-
porting errors and near misses, both for quality 
control and to make sure patients are told when 
their injuries were caused by errors. Most experts 
believe that reporting by physicians cannot be 
achieved without drastically limiting or eliminat-
ing legal liability.1-7,16 The view that physicians 
fail to report errors (both to patients and to hos-
pitals) because they are afraid of being sued is 
plausible and has intuitive appeal. But as Hyman 
and Silver recently reported, no empirical study 
has shown a negative correlation between “the 
intensity of malpractice risk and the frequency of 
error reporting, or has shown that liability corre-
lates inversely with health care quality.”17 A 2005 
survey of patients found that only one quarter of 
U.S. physicians disclosed errors to their patients; 
but the result was not that much different in New 
Zealand, a country that has had no-fault malprac-
tice insurance for more than three decades and 
where 61 percent of physicians still fail to report 
errors to their patients.18 
Thus, adoption of the confidentiality–immu-
nity model may produce little or no change in 
the reporting practices of physicians. Nor should 
this be surprising. There are many reasons why 
physicians do not report errors, including a gen-
eral reluctance to communicate with patients and 
a fear of disciplinary action or a loss of position or 
privileges.19-21 Nonetheless, even Congress seems 
to have accepted the prevailing medical view on 
liability, as evidenced by the July 2005 passage of 
the Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act, 
which establishes federal confidentiality protec-
tions for a new system of reporting medical er-
rors.22 If my analysis is correct, this law will have 
little or no effect on reporting patterns and even 
less on patient safety.
Like most defendants in tort litigation, physi-
cians have always despised malpractice suits. Even 
those who consider litigation appropriate in cas-
es of serious injury to a patient still think of the 
system as fundamentally flawed and corrupt. But 
modifying the traditional tort system in ways 
that will benefit both physicians and patients is 
much more difficult than is usually recognized 
by the medical profession and requires sustained 
and constructive dialogue with the legal profes-
sion. With respect to the issue of patient safety, 
at least, lawyers and physicians should see them-
selves as natural allies, rather than as predator and 
prey.16,23,24 The patient-safety problem is compli-
cated, and no single change in the tort system 
(including a recognition of a right to safety) will 
solve it, any more than the elimination of legal 
liability for vaccine manufacturers will solve our 
chronic vaccine shortages.25
making patient safet y a realit y
A right to safety will have to be implemented by 
hospital systems, but physicians will be central 
to its success. The most appropriate model for 
physicians is the success of the patient-safety pro-
grams for anesthesiologists, which were moti-
vated by liability suits and high rates of medical-
malpractice insurance. Because of the successful 
25-year program to make anesthesia safer for pa-
tients, the risk of death from anesthesia dropped 
from 1 in 5000 to about 1 in 250,000. As a con-
sequence, the malpractice insurance rate for an-
esthesiologists, once the highest in medicine, is 
now among the lowest.17,26
The anesthesiologists provide an instructive 
example for patient safety; the Joint Commission 
on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations has 
recently provided a less constructive one. One of 
the commission’s most recent patient-safety ini-
tiatives is to encourage physicians to wear a but-
ton that reads, “Ask me if I have washed my hands.” 
This is an example of putting the responsibility 
for patient safety on patients themselves.27 The 
fact that the commission sees patient self-defense 
actions as an important safety strategy is a symp-
tom of the problem, not a solution. Patients should, 
of course, be encouraged to participate actively in 
their care, but they cannot and should not be re-
sponsible for their own safety in an environment 
over which they have no control.
Hospitals can decide on their own to take 
the patient’s right to safety seriously. But few have 
done so, and the jury is still out on how seriously 
hospitals will take their commitments to the 
sounding board
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100,000 Lives Campaign. Effective pressure for 
a change in safety culture seems most likely to 
come from an increased risk of liability, which 
is signaled by an increase in patient-safety law-
suits, one incentive to which hospitals (at least 
those not still covered by charitable immunity) 
seem to respond. Legal actions that are focused 
on patient-safety systems in hospitals, rather than 
on the actions of individual physicians, could help 
encourage more serious consideration of other re-
forms as well.28-30
Physicians cannot change a hospital’s safety 
culture by themselves. But by working with pa-
tients (and their lawyers) to establish a patient’s 
right to safety, and by proposing and supporting 
patient-safety initiatives, physicians can help pres-
sure hospitals to change their operating systems 
to provide a safer environment for the benefit of 
all patients.
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